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Mexico’s Retrogression: 
Implications of a Bankruptcy Reorganization Gone Wrong 
Arturo C. Porzecanski 
 
An earlier essay (“Corporate Workouts in 
Mexico: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly”) 
told of how Mexico had made considerable 
progress in the past decade-and-a-half in 
matters pertaining to corporate law, the 
strengthening of property rights, and the ease of 
doing business.1 It highlighted in particular the 
benefits of a new law governing the Mexican 
insolvency regime—the Ley de Concursos 
Mercantiles (LCM, best translated as the 
“Business Reorganization Act” of 2000, as 
amended in 2007). 
 
It pointed out that the Mexican insolvency 
regime was being put to the test by the creditor-
unfriendly precedent that Vitro S.A.B. was 
trying to set. Vitro, one of the world’s largest 
producers and distributors of glass products, is 
one of several major Mexican corporations that 
found themselves at the losing end of various 
currency derivative contracts in late 2008, 
when in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers 
debacle, the Mexican peso unexpectedly took a 
big hit while the U.S. dollar rallied. 
 
This essay provides additional background on 
the Vitro case; updates the troubling 
developments in that restructuring proceeding 
so far this year; and discusses the implications 
of this landmark precedent—not least of which 
is the impression it is creating, namely, that 
Mexico is retrogressing, becoming an 
unpredictable  and  risky  jurisdiction  for  the 
 
                                                 
1 See my “Corporate Workouts in Mexico: The Good, 
the Bad, and the Ugly,” CSIS Issues in International 
Political Economy, April 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
adjudication of legitimate claims involving 
domestic and foreign creditors. 
 
Background 
 
Vitro S.A.B., one of Mexico’s leading 
multinational companies, is a holding that 
conducts substantially all of its international 
operations through subsidiaries, including more 
than a dozen in the United States, and has 
manufacturing facilities and distribution centers 
in many countries throughout the Americas and 
Europe. It has annual net sales approaching $2 
billion, maintains a workforce of about 17,000 
mostly concentrated in Mexico, and exports its 
products to more than 50 countries. 
 
Main Points: 
• The corporate restructuring of a major 
Mexican multinational (Vitro), now winding 
its way through the Mexican courts, is 
raising serious doubts about the capacity of 
the country’s insolvency regime to deliver 
an outcome viewed as fair and consistent 
with prevailing norms and practices in the 
United States and other reputable 
jurisdictions. 
 
• The case has the potential to complicate 
U.S.-Mexico diplomatic relations and to 
have a chilling effect on the easy access to 
foreign financing that Mexican corporations 
have enjoyed during recent years. Cemex, 
Mexico’s flagship multinational corporation, 
may be particularly vulnerable to adverse 
fallout from the Vitro case. 
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In early 2009, Vitro failed to pay $293 million 
in derivative contracts as well as interest 
payments on bonds maturing in 2012, 2013, 
and 2017, triggering a default on approximately 
$1.5 billion in debt held by banks and unrelated 
bondholders around the world. Subsequently, 
Vitro filed for voluntary bankruptcy in mid-
December of 2010 in the hope of gaining court 
approval for a restructuring plan that 
supposedly had the backing of a majority of its 
creditors.  
 
Yet to gain support for a restructuring plan that 
would spare shareholders and force creditors to 
take steep haircuts—a debt exchange worth less 
than 60 cents on the dollar—Vitro had taken 
the unusual step of creating, post-default, some 
$1.9 billion of intra-company loans from 
subsidiaries. This was an amount greater than 
their obligations to the company’s bona fide 
creditors. The company’s intention was to 
enable these subsidiary creditors—the ones that 
had lent money to the holding company—to 
cast votes in support of Vitro’s restructuring 
plan, thereby overwhelming any opposition 
from unrelated creditors. Moreover, its 
affiliates entered into a lockup agreement with 
the holding company that requires them to vote 
in favor of a restructuring that would release 
them from the payment guarantees they had 
extended to outside creditors. 
 
The issue of intra-company debt had previously 
been broached in the 2009 restructuring of 
Corporación Durango S.A.B. de C.V. (now 
renamed Bio-Pappel), one of Mexico’s largest 
paper products manufacturers. Durango, like 
Vitro and several other large Mexican 
companies, had also encountered debt-servicing 
difficulties in 2008 and had defaulted on more 
than $500 million of notes due in 2017. There 
were intra-company liabilities between 
Durango and its subsidiaries, and the 
bankruptcy court recognized these claims.2 
However, the company and its bondholders 
                                                 
2 Standard & Poor’s, “How Did Recovery Ratings on 
Mexican Corporate Issuers Perform through the 
Financial Crisis?” October 3, 2011, p. 5. 
came to agreement on a reorganization plan 
that was finalized in August 2009, and thus 
Durango’s management did not have to force 
approval of its restructuring proposal by casting 
the votes of its subsidiaries. The new 
obligations that were created (senior guaranteed 
notes) subordinated all intra-company loans 
and placed restrictions on the creation of any 
new intra-company obligations.3 
 
The case of Vitro is thus the first time ever—
and not just since the Ley de Concursos 
Mercantiles was enacted 11 years ago—that the 
Mexican courts have been presented with such 
an odd situation: A debtor company attempting 
to defeat its genuine creditors by creating, after 
its default, massive intra-company liabilities for 
the sole purpose of rigging the outcome of its 
own workout process. It is a maneuver that 
would be deemed illegal in the United States 
and other major jurisdictions, where any intra-
company liabilities would be offset by their 
counterpart intra-company assets, such that 
subsidiaries play no role in the consolidated 
entity’s restructuring. 
 
Recent Developments 
 
As mentioned, Vitro filed for voluntary 
bankruptcy in mid-December 2010 (in 
Monterrey’s Federal District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial Circuit). At the time, its 
aggregate outstanding third-party consolidated 
indebtedness was approximately $1.7 billion, 
$1.2 billion of which represented the 
outstanding principal amount owed on the 
aforementioned bonds maturing in 2012, 2013, 
and 2017. Vitro’s aggregate outstanding 
indebtedness to its direct and indirect 
subsidiaries (the intra-company debt) was 
approximately $1.9 billion as of end-2010.4 
 
                                                 
3 Fitch Ratings, Latin America High Yield, vol. II, 
November 2, 2010, pp. 32–33. 
4 U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Texas, 
“Memorandum of Opinion on Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction,” Vitro S.A.B. Plaintiff, June 24, 2011, p. 
4. 
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On January 7, 2011, Vitro’s bankruptcy filing 
was denied, because the Mexican court found 
that intra-company claims should not be 
considered. When Vitro appealed, the Fourth 
Judicial Circuit Appeals Court judge initially 
ruled in late January that the decision could not 
be appealed. This procedural decision was 
challenged by Vitro, and on April 8 the same 
judge reversed himself, accepting the 
company’s filing of a concurso mercantil 
voluntario con plan de reestructura previo—a 
bankruptcy reorganization plan that is filed 
voluntarily by a debtor. 
 
Vitro also filed a Chapter 15 petition in the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
New York, applying for recognition of the 
Mexican filing as a “foreign main proceeding” 
under sections 1515 and 1517 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. The purpose was to ensure 
that the U.S. courts would defer to the Mexican 
courts, so that Vitro’s bankruptcy 
reorganization process would take place in 
only one—its home—jurisdiction. At the 
request of dissident bondholders, the venue for 
a decision on this petition was changed from 
New York to Dallas (part of the Northern 
District of Texas), where on July 21 a Chapter 
15 ruling was issued in favor of Vitro’s 
Mexico-based proceedings. 
 
Vitro’s concurso mercantil process in Mexico 
then advanced along the expected path. Back 
in April, the court in Monterrey requested the 
Federal Institute of Bankruptcy Specialists 
(IFECOM) to appoint an insolvency 
professional called a conciliator (conciliador), 
for the purpose of reviewing the validity and 
ranking of all claims according to their 
seniority. He is Javier Navarro-Velasco, a 
seasoned bankruptcy attorney and a partner in 
the Monterrey office of Baker & McKenzie.  
 
Last August, a final list of creditors was issued 
by Conciliator Navarro and was submitted to 
the relevant court, whereupon a decision was 
issued granting recognition of rank, amount, 
and order of those creditors contained in the 
definitive   list.    The   list   recognized   the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
contentious intra-company claims created by 
Vitro in the wake of its default. 
 
Latest Developments 
 
The restructuring process has taken an 
unexpected turn in the last few weeks, 
however. Navarro found that the company’s 
creditors were sharply divided as to Vitro’s 
December 2010 proposal. Those representing 
intra-company claims sided with Vitro’s 
management, while the genuine creditors who 
Vitro Restructuring Time-Line 
 
Feb. 2009 Vitro defaults on its bonds. 
 
Mar. 2009 Vitro begins negotiations with its 
  bondholders. 
 
Dec. 2009 Vitro secretly engages in various
  intra-company transactions; 
  its subsidiaries go from owing 
  the holding $1.2 billion to being 
  owed $1.5 billion. 
   
Oct. 2010 Vitro finally discloses these 
  intra-company transactions. 
 
Nov. 2010 Vitro requests debt forgiveness 
  from its bondholders via a debt 
  exchange, but it is rejected. 
 
Dec. 2010 Vitro files a reorganization plan.  
 
Jan. 2011 The judge rejects the plan 
  because of its dependence on 
  intra-company debt for approval. 
 
Apr. 2011 An Appellate Court reverses the 
  decision and accepts Vitro’s plan. 
  A conciliator is appointed. 
 
Aug. 2011 On advice of the conciliator, the 
  list of recognized debts receives 
  court approval; intra-company 
 debtors are included. 
 
Oct. 2011 The conciliator does not host 
  negotiations based on alternative 
  financial scenarios; ignores a 
  creditor counterproposal; and 
  submits a revised plan more 
punitive for Vitro’s creditors. 
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collectively own more than 60 percent of 
Vitro’s $1.2 billion of outstanding senior notes 
and the majority of the third-party claims were 
opposed. In fact, the latter group put forth a 
counterproposal to Navarro on October 19 that 
sought a restructuring not as lopsidedly 
favorable to Vitro’s shareholders.5  
 
Faced with this split, the reasonable expectation 
was that Navarro would seek a negotiated 
solution most parties could embrace, though a 
consensus is not required for a reorganization 
agreement to be valid and binding. Mexican 
law (the LCM) basically requires that the 
agreement be approved by the debtor and 
creditors representing a majority (at least half) 
of the recognized unsecured debt. Mexican law 
also allows secured creditors who do not 
approve of the proposed settlement to continue 
with their enforcement proceedings, executing 
on whatever collateral has been pledged to 
them. 
 
The surprising turn of events was that, on 
October 31, Navarro handed to the relevant 
bankruptcy judge, Sandra Elizabeth López, a 
finalized version of Vitro’s restructuring plan 
that was less favorable to all creditors and was 
particularly harsh toward any dissenting, 
holdout creditors. This is hardly behavior 
consistent with the role of a “conciliator”—
someone who overcomes distrust or animosity 
and attempts to reconcile divergent interests. 
Rather than acting as an impartial, constructive 
party in this restructuring process, Conciliator 
Navarro appears to have sided with Vitro in 
coming up with an even more debtor-biased 
financial plan. 
 
According to a press release issued by Vitro, 
the new plan is “substantially identical” to that 
filed by the company in December 2010; 
includes “certain improved economic terms” on 
new mandatory convertible debentures 
                                                 
5 Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders, “Ad Hoc Group 
of Vitro Noteholders Submitted Proposal and Does Not 
Support the Plan of Reorganization Filed by the 
Conciliador,” Business Wire, November 4, 2011. 
(MCDs); offers an additional fee to consenting 
creditors; and incorporates disincentives to 
dissident creditors “designed to ensure that the 
restructuring contemplated by the Concurso 
Plan is consummated and implemented without 
delay or risk to Vitro or its creditors.”6 These 
disincentives include setting up a Creditor 
Litigation Trust into which interest payments 
due to nonconsenting creditors will be made 
and from which all litigation-related expenses 
will be deducted, as well as imposing time 
limits after which dissenting creditors forfeit 
the entirety of their investments. 
 
However, an impartial examination of 
Navarro’s amended restructuring plan suggests 
that the “carrots” introduced are not meaningful 
and that the “sticks” are quite punitive, such 
that all things considered, his proposal actually 
appears worse than the company’s previous 
offer. 
 
For example, according to recently published 
research by J.P. Morgan’s senior corporate debt 
analyst Jacob Steinfeld, fewer new bonds and 
MCDs are now on offer for creditors who 
participate, and the “sweeteners” mentioned do 
not deliver much additional value. Thus, for 
creditors planning to participate, “We value the 
company’s latest proposal lower than its past 
proposal.”7 Regarding the fate of nonconsenting 
creditors, they are now the object of a blatantly 
discriminatory deal structure meant to pressure 
them into surrendering or face losses much 
more significant than those that consenting 
creditors will bear. Lamentably for its creditors, 
“the company can support a much higher debt 
balance than what is being proposed and could 
offer a proposal that is worth significantly 
more.”8 
 
 
                                                 
6 Vitro Press Release, “Vitro Announces Filing by 
Conciliador of Concurso Plan in Mexican Court,” 
October 31, 2011. 
7 Jacob Steinfeld, “Vitro S.A.: New Plan Structure 
Aimed to Pressure Non-Consenting Creditors,” J.P. 
Morgan, November 1, 2011, p. 2. 
8 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Short-Term Implications 
 
Since the conciliator succeeded in sowing more 
discord among creditors than existed before he 
got involved in the case, the immediate 
consequence of the ongoing legal proceedings 
in Monterrey will be more litigation—in 
Mexico, the United States, and perhaps 
elsewhere. 
 
The conciliator does not appear to have acted in 
a neutral or constructive manner. Reportedly, 
he did not obtain or make available the kind of 
financial information necessary for any 
meaningful exploration of alternative financial 
scenarios and thus for a determination of 
Vitro’s ability to pay.9 He allegedly did not 
engage in a negotiation process before or after 
receiving an alternate restructuring proposal.10 
Therefore, Navarro’s actions will surely be 
challenged in accordance with Mexico’s legal 
provisions during the coming days and weeks. 
 
Beyond that, ongoing litigation in New York 
initiated by Wilmington Trust in its capacity as 
indenture trustee with respect to Vitro’s 2012 
and 2017 bonds in default—a combined $1 
billion outstanding—will also take added 
importance. These securities were guaranteed 
by numerous Vitro subsidiaries located in the 
United States and elsewhere. In their respective 
indentures, each of the Vitro-owned guarantors 
“expressly acknowledges that this Guaranty is 
governed by the laws of the State of New York 
and expressly agrees that any rights and 
privileges that such Guarantor might otherwise 
have under the laws of Mexico shall not be 
applicable.”11 Vitro’s reorganization plan 
contemplates the stripping of these subsidiary 
guarantees such that the bonds may be 
restructured, but Wilmington argues that these 
                                                 
9 Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders, “Ad Hoc Group 
of Vitro Noteholders Submitted Proposal.” 
10 Ibid. 
11 Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of 
New York, “Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,” 
Wilmington Trust N.A. Plaintiff, September 29, 2011, p. 
5. 
guarantees cannot be affected by the holding’s 
insolvency proceeding in Mexico. A ruling in 
this case (on the part of the New York Supreme 
Court in New York City) should be 
forthcoming. 
 
Implications for Issuers and Investors 
 
At a time when Mexico is beset by other 
serious challenges in the sphere of law and 
order, it is a pity that the progress that lenders 
and investors thought the country had made—
in corporate governance, creditors’ rights, 
judicial impartiality, and the ease of doing 
business—is suffering a setback because of 
Vitro’s unsettling saga. 
 
At first glance, the trend in successful bond 
issuance on the part of Mexican companies 
rated below investment grade does not reveal 
any Vitro-related reduction in access to the 
international capital markets. Indeed, despite 
the debt-servicing difficulties experienced by 
several leading Mexican companies in 2008–
2009,12 new issuance in the U.S. dollar market 
has bounced back nicely since mid-2009—and 
2011 appears set for a banner year. Through 
end-October, and regardless of all the market 
turmoil courtesy of Southern Europe’s debt 
woes, Mexican corporations have managed to 
raise $4.4 billion, up sharply from $2.8 billion, 
in the first 10 months of 2010. 
 
However, a look behind the overall numbers 
shows that a great deal of Mexico-related 
corporate default risk is riding on a single bet—
the continued financial viability of Cemex. 
Granted, it is by far the largest multinational 
corporation in Latin America, not just Mexico, as 
measured by the value of its foreign assets and 
the number of its employees abroad and is one of 
                                                 
12 Seven speculative-grade Mexican corporate issuers 
rated by Standard & Poor’s defaulted during the 2008–
2010 period. Five resolved them within two years and 
the weighted average recovery rate was 67 percent. The 
two as yet unresolved cases are Vitro and Industrias 
Unidas. See Standard & Poor’s, “How Did Recovery 
Ratings on Mexican Corporate Issuers Perform?” pp. 3–
4. 
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Source: Bloomberg. 
 
the largest cement companies in the world, with 
a presence in more than 50 countries. 
 
Yet Cemex has been skirting a liquidity—and 
some would say a solvency—crisis for the past 
three years. In August 2009, the company was 
fortunate to reach an agreement with 75 bank 
and private placement bondholders for the 
refinancing of $15 billion of debt. Almost half 
of that amount has since been paid down with 
the proceeds from asset sales, cost savings, and 
the placement of new bonds with coupons 
paying at least 9 percent. Cemex accounted for 
38 percent of all Mexican high-yield issuance 
in the U.S. dollar market during 2009; 17 
percent of what Mexican companies raised in 
2010; and a whopping 56 percent of new dollar 
bond issues so far this year—$2.45 billon. 
 
Given that Cemex’s performance is heavily 
dependent on the pace of construction 
activity—and the weak markets of Europe, 
Mexico, and the United States account for three 
quarters of its total sales—the company has not 
recorded a profit for eight quarters in a row, 
prompting its share price to plummet by nearly 
two-thirds since November 2009. As of end-
September, Cemex remained out of compliance 
with a year-end, debt-to-EBITDA covenant 
ceiling under its financing agreement with 
(mostly bank) creditors. Continued weakness in 
the Mexican peso, which hurts the company 
because of its currency mismatches—97 
percent of its debt is in currencies other than 
the Mexican peso—means that Cemex may 
have to obtain a waiver or reset from its 
creditors. 
 
One would think that the precedent being set by 
Vitro would weigh more and more heavily on 
the minds of bond investors in Cemex and 
other risky Mexican corporations. After all, 
Cemex has a similar structure of debt at the 
holding level backed by guarantees from its 
foreign subsidiaries—and so do other Mexican 
companies. It may not be able to support a $20 
billion debt load,13 as implied by the 
company’s single-B rating as per Fitch and the 
recently downgraded assessment from Standard 
& Poor’s (B- with a Negative Outlook as of 
November 9). S&P’s downgrade reflected its 
realization that the company’s financial 
performance “will remain weak in the coming 
two years,” such that Cemex “will need to 
renegotiate the credit conditions of its financing 
agreement . . . and seek refinancing options for 
its late-2013 and 2014 debt maturities.”14 
 
To see whether the Vitro precedent is starting 
to be internalized by credit analysts, investors, 
and rating agencies, last week this author 
contacted about a dozen of them and asked 
whether bondholders in particular are aware of 
the Vitro saga and are starting to hesitate to 
commit funds to other Mexican companies—
especially on an unsecured basis. 
 
The anecdotal evidence is mixed. Many 
investors are reportedly aware of the Vitro 
case, and some of them are asking more credit 
questions of sell-side and rating-agency 
analysts than before. The view often expressed 
is that Vitro may be a special case because of a 
uniquely investor-unfriendly attitude on the 
part of its management that will not be seen 
                                                 
13 Total debt adjusted for off-balance sheet obligations. 
See Fitch Ratings, “Cemex S.A.B. de C. V. Full Rating 
Report,” September 14, 2011, p. 22. 
14 Standard & Poor’s Press Release, “Cemex 
Downgraded to ‘B-’ from ‘B’, Outlook Negative, Off 
Watch, on Concern for Performance in Depressed Key 
Markets,” November 9, 2011. 
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elsewhere. Others say that they expect Vitro’s 
restructuring plan to be thwarted by the courts 
on appeal, or even to lead to an eventual 
amendment in the Ley de Concursos 
Mercantiles—to clarify that the intent of the 
LCM is to handle the financial problems of any 
company on a consolidated basis, as per the 
law’s Article 4-II. In this vein, many investors 
are pleased to see that Vitro’s genuine creditors 
are willing to stand up for their rights and 
pursue litigation on both sides of the border.  
 
One fund manager quoted in a Bloomberg 
News story recently stated: “If I’m a CEO of a 
legitimate Mexican company, I’d be very mad 
right now at Vitro” because “Vitro’s use of 
intercompany debt may cause other Mexican 
companies to pay a ‘Vitro premium.’”15 
 
With regard to Cemex, specifically, many 
investors are said to perceive it as “too big to 
fail”—a company that the government would 
help out in case of emergency. Many also find 
comfort in knowing that because so many 
banks, bondholders, and jurisdictions are 
involved, Cemex may be “too complicated to 
fail.” Bondholders, who are said to feel more 
secure precisely because banks are deeply 
involved in Cemex, may have an incentive to 
refinance the company’s obligations and to 
keep it out of bankruptcy court—especially 
given the legal uncertainties generated by the 
Vitro precedent.  
 
As for any notable changes in the language of 
bond indentures, there is no evidence that the 
new issuance out of Mexico has included 
clauses that explicitly subordinate intra-
company claims—clauses of the type contained 
in the bonds that Vitro issued and is now 
attempting to void. Some point out that even 
the retailer Grupo Elektra and the broadcaster 
TV Azteca, both owned by billionaire Ricardo 
                                                 
15 The quote is attributed to Robert Rauch, who manages 
$2.2 billion of emerging-market assets at Gramercy 
Advisors LLC. See Jonathan Roeder and Jonathan J. 
Levin, “JPMorgan Says Sell Defaulted Vitro Debt on 
Overvalued Offer,” Bloomberg News, November 8, 
2011. 
Salinas Pliego—a man with a checkered past 
who is reportedly viewed with suspicion by 
some investors16—were able to sell bonds 
earlier this year without apparently having to 
alter the usual boilerplate clauses to address 
intra-company debt. Only in one case—the 
refinancing of Iusacell debt this past June—did 
creditors insert language explicitly 
subordinating the mobile operator’s intra-
company debts and banning the voting of any 
subsidiaries’ claims in the event of a future 
debt restructuring.17 
 
The point is also made that investor demand for 
high-yield issues out of Mexico and other 
emerging markets, or even out of the United 
States for that matter, is largely determined not 
so much by company- or indenture-specific 
factors but rather by waves of investor 
optimism and risk appetite—especially these 
days, when “risk-free” rates are extraordinarily 
low. 
 
In sum, it may be too early to measure the 
broader market consequences of Vitro’s 
liability manipulations and of the questions 
raised by the handling of its concurso 
mercantil. Much probably depends on the final 
outcome of the litigation taking place in 
Mexico and the United States. In the meantime, 
as long as investors persuade themselves that 
one rotten apple does not contaminate the 
whole barrel, Mexican corporations may be 
able to retain the easy access to domestic and 
foreign financing that they have enjoyed during 
recent years. 
 
 
                                                 
16 The companies returned to the international bond 
market for the first time since Chairman Ricardo Salinas 
settled a fraud suit with the SEC in 2006. See Veronica 
Navarro Espinosa and Jonathan J. Levin, “Fraud 
Settlement Sapping TV Azteca Bond Demand,” 
Bloomberg News, May 19, 2011. 
17 Grupo Iusacell Celular, S.A. de C.V., “9 percent 
Senior Secured Notes Due 2017 Indenture,” U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission Exhibit T3C, July 
5, 2011, Section 3.5, “Intercompany Indebtedness,” p. 
38. 
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Conclusion 
 
Current financial-market perceptions 
notwithstanding, the fact is that Mexico is 
retrogressing, becoming an unpredictable and 
risky jurisdiction for the adjudication of 
legitimate claims involving domestic and 
international lenders and investors.  
 
This conclusion follows from an analysis of the 
precedent-setting corporate workout involving 
a major Mexican multinational (Vitro) now 
winding its way through the Mexican courts. It 
raises serious doubts about the capacity of that 
country’s insolvency regime to deliver an 
outcome viewed as fair and consistent with 
prevailing norms and practices in the United 
States and other reputable jurisdictions. The 
case may well have a chilling effect on the easy 
access to foreign financing that Mexican 
corporations have enjoyed during recent years. 
Cemex, Mexico’s flagship company, appears 
particularly vulnerable to adverse fallout from 
the Vitro case. 
 
There may be diplomatic ramifications as well. 
Two members of the U.S. Congress, 
presumably prompted by alarm bells rung by 
some of their constituents, have recently 
expressed concern to the Mexican authorities 
about the implications of the Vitro case. 
According to a news report, Representatives 
Patrick Meehan of Pennsylvania and Jared 
Polis of Colorado wrote to the Mexican 
ambassador to the United States, warning that 
Vitro’s bankruptcy strategy would “chill cross-
border investment” and should not be allowed 
to set a legal precedent: “Vitro’s unorthodox 
reorganization violated international 
bankruptcy norms by preserving equity for its 
own shareholders at the expense of its public 
creditors, many of whom are U.S.-based.”18  
 
                                                 
18 Heather Perlberg, “Vitro’s ‘Unorthodox’ Debt Plan 
Spurs U.S. Lawmakers’ Complaints,” Bloomberg News, 
October 24, 2011. 
Evidently, the Vitro case has the potential to 
complicate even U.S.-Mexico diplomatic 
relations. 
 
 
 
Arturo C. Porzecanski, PhD, is a CSIS senior 
associate (nonresident) and a professor of 
international economics and international 
finance at American University, with the 
academic appointment of Distinguished 
Economist-in-Residence.  
E-mail: aporzeca@american.edu 
 
